References

alternative

Альтернативная энергетика и экология (ISJAEE)

Alternative Energy and Ecology (ISJAEE)

1608-8298

Международный издательский дом научной периодики "Спейс

10.15518/isjaee.2015.13-14.012

alternative-62

Research Article

ЭКОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ АСПЕКТЫ ЭНЕРГЕТИКИ

ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF ENERGY

ЭЛЕКТРОМАГНИТНЫЙ АРМАГЕДДОН?

ELECTROMAGNETIC ARMAGEDDON?

Гуревич

В. И.

Gurevich

V. I.

канд. техн. наук, ведущий инженер-специалист, начальник сектораЦентральной электрической лаборатории Электрической компании Израиля

Ph.D., Senior specialist and Head of section of the Central Electric Laboratory at Israel Electric Corp

vladimir.gurevich@gmx.net

Электрическая компании ИзраиляИзраильIsrael Electric CorporationIsrael

2015

09112015

013-14108116

2015

Международный издательский дом научной периодики "Спейс

https://www.isjaee.com/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice

https://www.isjaee.com/jour/article/view/62

Проблема преднамеренных электромагнитных деструктивных воздействий (ПЭДВ) на электроэнергетические системы становится в последнее время все более актуальной в связи с двумя современными тенденциями: расширяющимся применением микроэлектроники и микропроцессорной техники в электроэнергетике – с одной стороны, и интенсивными разработками средств дистанционного поражения электронной аппаратуры – с другой. Наиболее мощным и разрушительным средством поражения электронной аппаратуры является электромагнитный импульс высотного ядерного взрыва (ЭМИ ЯВ). История экспериментальных высотных ядерных взрывов насчитывает уже полвека. За это время были опубликованы многие десятки научных работ, детально описывающих это явление и меры защиты от него. С учетом этого можно было бы предположить, что проблема защиты от ЭМИ ЯВ давно решена и современные электроэнергетические системы хорошо защищены от этого явления. Исследование, проведенное автором, показывает, что на самом деле это не так, и за прошедшие десятилетия ни в одной стране мира не предпринято никаких практических мер по защите национальных инфраструктур от ЭМИ ЯВ и все ограничивается лишь написанием отчетов и рекомендаций. В статье анализируются причины такого положения дел, в частности, политические и военные аспекты этой проблемы.

The problem of Intentional Destructive Electromagnetic Impacts (IDEI) on power systems becomes recently more and more actual in connection with two modern trends: an extending application of microelectronics and microprocessor-based devices and systems in electric power industry - on the one hand, and intensive designs special equipment for distance destruction of electronic devices and systems - with another. The most powerful method for such destruction is the High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) as a result of high-altitude nuclear explosion. The history of experimental high-altitude nuclear explosions includes already half a century. During this time many tens the scientific articles and books in details presenting this phenomenon and measures of protection from it, have been published. In view of this fact, it would be possible to assume, that the problem of protection against HEMP for a long time is solved and modern power systems are well protected from this phenomenon. The research performed by the author, displays, that actually it not and for the last decades in one country of the world is not undertaken any practical measures on protection of national infrastructures against HEMP and all is restricted only to writing of reports, recommendations and guidelines. In the paper the reasons for such situation (in particular, political and military aspects of the problem) are analyzed.

электромагнитный импульсЭМИвысотный ядерный взрывЭМИ ЯВэлектроэнергетические системыпреднамеренные электромагнитные деструктивные воздействияПЭДВ

electromagnetic pulseEMPhigh altitude electromagnetic pulseHEMPpower systemsintentional destructive electromagnetic impactsIDEI

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.